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THE DUTY TO PROTECT SCHOOL CHILDREN:
THE EFFECT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
MIDDLE BUCKS DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
A violation by the state of a person's constitutionally protected right
triggers a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Congress' purpose in
enacting § 1983 was to provide a remedy to parties deprived of constitu-
tional rights by a state official's abuse of his position while acting under
color of state law.2 In the years since its passage in 1871, the courts have
expanded the application of 1983, allowing it to evolve to reflect the
needs of a changing society.3 Recently, courts have struggled with the
question of whether liability under § 1983 can be extended to situations
where a private individual is responsible for the conduct causing the con-
stitutional violation.4
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided a difficult
§ 1983 case, D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School.5 In
Middle Bucks, the court required the existence of "special relationship"
custody between the victim and the state before a finding of § 1983 liabil-
ity can be made when private individuals inflict the injuries. Because the
court refused to acknowledge the blatant disregard of the school and its
officials for the safety of the plaintiffs, public school students who were
subjected repeatedly to the humiliation of sexual abuse by fellow students
during school hours in the classroom, the Third Circuit failed to extend
§ 1983 liability to the school and its officials. This decision, grounded on
an unnecessarily strict interpretation of legal precedent and an extremely
1. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1992). Section 1983 serves as a guarantor of local government restraint respect-
ing all federally unlawful conduct, a reliable source of victim compensation, and a vehicle for dyna-
mism in the declaration of federal rights. Id. at 762.
2. D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir. 1990).
3. See Lewis, supra note 1.
4. See, eg., Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 341
(1990); Swader v. Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1990).
5. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
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shortsighted evaluation of the facts, is a travesty and serves to shield pub-
lic schools and their employees from § 1983 liability when students' con-
stitutionally protected rights are violated by private individuals while
students are in the intermittent custody of the school.
II. COMPONENTS OF A CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A brief overview of § 1983 and its components will facilitate an un-
derstanding of its application in the Middle Bucks setting. Originally
passed as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,6 § 1983 provided protec-
tion for former slaves from abuses of government.7 Since its passage,
applications of this statute have continued to evolve as new constitutional
protections have been recognized.8 However, courts have become aware
of the potential for § 1983 to become a means of finding tort liability of
government officials and have become increasingly unwilling to expand
its coverage in recent years.9
A. Analysis of "Protected Constitutional Right"
Plaintiffs alleging a § 1983 violation must first prove that they have
been deprived of a constitutionally protected right. The historical expan-
sion of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment has resulted in
the general characterization of a constitutionally protected right as one
that is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."' 0
An analysis of prior decisions provides guidance for establishing
when a right is or has become fundamental and, therefore, protected
although it may not be specified in the Constitution itself. Several courts
have recognized the existence of a substantive right to be free from bodily
abuse. In Ingraham v. Wright,"I the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests extend to protect
school children from abuses of corporal punishment. The Court con-
cluded that, "where school authorities, acting under color of state law,
6. Lewis, supra note 1, at 757.
7. This statute provides, in pertinent part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, regulation, custom or usage of any state
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
8. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 767.
9. Id. at 760.
10. Metcalf v. Long, 615 F. Supp. 1108, 1120 (D.C. Del. 1985).
11. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
[Vol. 28:911
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deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the
child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are implicated."12
In P.L.C. v. Housing Authority of the County of Warren,13 the plain-
tiff brought a § 1983 complaint against the Housing Authority after one
of its employees, who had been provided with a key by the Housing Au-
thority, entered her apartment and raped her. 4 The court reasoned that
"plaintiff's right to be free from such bodily injury and harm is a right of
constitutional magnitude."1"
Even more convincing of the recognition of the constitutional right
to maintenance of bodily integrity is the Doe v. New York City Depart-
ment of Social Services decision. 6 That case examined whether a state
agency could be liable for failing to protect a child from physical and
sexual abuse at the hands of the child's foster father.7 The court failed
to address directly the threshold requirement that the plaintiff establish
the existence of a constitutional right. However, the question of entity
liability warranted close inspection by the court, inferring that the consti-
tutional right to be free from physical and sexual abuse was "a given. '"18
Finally, a case involving the physical and sexual abuse of handi-
capped children by the school district bus driver, Doe "'A" v. Special
School District of St. Louis County,1 9 provides language which compels
the recognition of a constitutionally protected right. According to the
court, "[t]he acts intrude upon the personal privacy and bodily integrity
of these children. The acts intrude in ways more personal than a jail-
house beating and in ways which will surely leave psychological scars
long after physical healing is complete."2 Clearly, therefore, judicial
precedent exists which supports the conclusion that the right to be free
from state intrusions into bodily integrity rises to a level requiring consti-
tutional protection.
12. Id. at 674.
13. 588 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
14. Id. at 965.
15. Id. at 962.
16. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (Doe I).
17. Id. at 136-137.
18. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 667 F. Supp. 1088, 1094 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(Stoneking I) (discussing the inference of a substantive right).
19. 637 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
20. Id. at 1145.
19931
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B. Interpreting "Color of State Law"
In a historical decision, Monroe v. Pape,21 the United States
Supreme Court linked the "color of state law" provision of § 1983 to the
well-settled interpretation of state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.22 Originally passed to supply enforcement teeth for the
Fourteenth Amendment,23 § 1983 specifically sought to remedy govern-
ment-perpetrated harms, 24 harms which are viewed as qualitatively dif-
ferent because of the constitutional implications. 25
1. Liability of Individual Defendants
Claims brought under § 1983 have identified at least three categories
of individual perpetrators: 1) a state actor who is also the perpetrator of
the act;26 2) a state actor who is not the actual perpetrator but was re-
sponsible for a policy which allegedly allowed or encouraged the perpe-
trator who was also a state actor;27 and 3) a state actor, again, who is not
the actual perpetrator but whose policy allegedly allowed or encouraged
the actual perpetrator who was a private individual. 28 A finding of indi-
vidual liability for all three categories of actors has become increasingly
difficult, particularly for those who fall into the third category. 29
Another aspect of individual liability pertinent to the Middle Bucks
case is that in order for liability to attach for an alleged violation of
§ 1983, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's acts exceeded
21. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on a different issue by Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
22. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 769.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 769-74.
25. Id.
26. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that the "objective legal reasonable-
ness" of the challenged conduct should be tested against "clearly established law").
27. See D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990) (focusing on the
policies enacted by the individual defendants which allowed the offensive conduct of an employee to
occur); see also Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 667 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (Stonek-
ing I) (finding that a "special relationship" existed between the individual defendants and the plain-
tiff which allowed liability to attach); Robert G. v. Newburgh City Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 3210
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
28. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding
that liability under § 1983 does not extend to injuries sustained by plaintiff due to the conduct of a
private actor in the absence of a "special relationship" with the state as exemplified by situations
where the state has acted to limit the plaintiff's freedom to act on his own behalf, e.g., in situations of
incarceration or involuntary institutionalization).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 33-36. While an in depth analysis of the scope of § 1983
is beyond the focus of this paper, it is sufficient to note that courts have evolved an expansive defense
of qualified immunity which has all but eliminated liability for individuals who as state actors de-
prive any person of his constitutionally protected rights. Id.
4
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mere negligence.3° The Court has stated that "the Due Process Clause is
simply not implicated by a negligent act by an official causing unintended
loss of or injury to life, liberty or property. ' 31 This standard applies to
both acts of commission and acts of omission by state actors.32
Fearing the possibility of opening "litigation floodgates" and in-
creasing judicial interference with discretionary decisions by government
officials, courts have allowed the affirmative defense of qualified immu-
nity to develop to insulate government officials from potential liability.33
The direct result of this broad application of qualified immunity is that
fewer government officials are held individually accountable for viola-
tions of § 1983 while suit against governmental units may be more likely
to succeed.34 Several courts have held, however, that qualified immunity
will fail if the right violated has been recognized previously as one of
"unmistakable application and clarity. ' 35 In other words, individual de-
fendants may be entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable officials
in the defendant's position at the time of the incident could have believed
that their conduct complied with established legal standards.36
2. Entity Liability
Prior to Monell v. Department of Social Services,3 7 Monroe v. Pape38
supplied the legal precedent for concluding that entity defendants lie
wholly outside § 1983.39 The identity of a municipality as a "person"
within the meaning of § 1983 was established by the Supreme Court in
Monell.4 Based on Monell, a municipality or other governmental entity
may be liable, within limits, "when execution of a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury."41
Therefore, liability of a municipality or entity such as a school district is
predicated upon the execution of a governmental policy or custom.42
30. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
31. Id. at 328.
32. See Steven F. Huefner, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After DeShaney, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 1940, 1969 (1990).
33. Lewis, supra note 1, at 758-59.
34. Id. at 759.
35. Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) and Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 817-19 (1982)).
36. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989) (Stoneking II).
37. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
38. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
39. Id. at 187.
40. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
41. Id. at 694.
42. See, e.g., Tilson v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 1990 WL 98932, *2 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
1993]
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In decisions after Monell, the Court has provided guidance in the
area of municipal liability. In Brandon v. Holt,43 the Court was forced to
decide whether the Memphis City police department was liable under
§ 1983 for the acts of a police officer who viciously assaulted plaintiffs.'
The Court held that "judgment against a public servant in his 'official
capacity' imposes liability on the entity he represents provided, of course,
the public entity received notice and an opportunity to respond. '45
Also, municipal liability under § 1983 requires a determination that
the entity's challenged policy or custom is the "but for" cause of the
plaintiff's injury.4 6 In other words, the plaintiff would not have been
injured "but for" the municipality's action or inaction based on its poli-
cies or customs. This determination is, therefore, fact intensive.4 7 Proxi-
mate causation can result from entity actions based on deliberate choice,
actions consistent with a settled entity custom, or inaction rising to the
level of "deliberate indifference" to a frequently recurring circum-
stance.48 In cases where the alleged governmental policy causing the
plaintiff's injuries is a failure to act, the plaintiff must prove that the
supervisory failure to act or to investigate communicated a message of
toleration or approval to the offending subordinate.4 9 Liability is predi-
cated upon more than mere "inaction and insensitivity."5
In its Middle Bucks decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on a controversial United States Supreme Court decision,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,5 ' to deter-
mine whether § 1983 liability should extend to the individual school de-
fendants and the school as an entity defendant. In DeShaney, the
Supreme Court limited the finding of § 1983 liability in cases where the
perpetrator of the offensive conduct is a private actor to those situations
where a "special relationship" exists between the plaintiff and the state
actor. An example of such a special relationship occurs when the state
attempts to limit the plaintiff's freedom to act on his own behalf (in situ-
ations of incarceration or institutionalization for example).5 2
43. 469 U.S. 464 (1985).
44. Id. at 468-69.
45. Id. at 471-72.
46. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 667 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (Stoneking1).
47. Id.
48. Lewis, supra note 1, at 757. See also City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989).
49. See Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Stoneking v. Bradford Area
Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988) (Stoneking II).
50. Chinchello, 805 F.2d at 133.
51. DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
52. Id. at 200.
[Vol. 28:911
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The facts presented by the DeShaney case were numbing. A four-
year-old boy, Joshua DeShaney, lived in the legal custody of his abusive
father. 3 The child had acquired a lengthy medical record with the local
hospital and with the County Department of Social Services (DSS) as the
victim of child abuse. 4 In spite of the repeated reported incidents and
serious warning signs of severe child abuse, DSS failed to take action."
Joshua remained in his father's custody. 6 Ultimately, Joshua was beaten
so severely that he was admitted to the hospital in a coma, with brain
damage that resulted in profound retardation. 7 In spite of the protective
nature of DSS's actions, the Court held that the State owes an affirmative
duty to protect against harm "when the State takes a person into its cus-
tody and holds him there against his will."58 However, Joshua's injuries
were inflicted while he was in the custody of his father. The state was
therefore not liable under § 1983.19
C. Applicability to Middle Bucks
This review of the components of a § 1983 claim indicates that in
order to succeed, the Middle Bucks plaintiffs had to show that a constitu-
tionally protected right had been violated, and that the actions of private
individuals responsible for the violations were allowed to occur under a
school policy, in this case, a policy of inaction, enforced by the deliberate
indifference of school officials. If the court found that the school officials
had a policy of deliberate indifference, then liability could also be im-
posed on the school district.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
The facts of the Middle Bucks case, as presented in the plaintiffs'
complaint,' describe an alarmingly chaotic, physically and emotionally
degrading environment existing in a graphic arts classroom in Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, a part of the public school sys-
tem in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs were D.R., a sixteen-
53. Id. at 191.
54. Id. at 192.
55. Id. at 193.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 199-200.
59. Id. at 202.
60. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1378 (3d Cir. 1992)
(dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Sloviter disclosing complaint's allegations in more detail).
1993]
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year-old girl with a near-total hearing impairment and the accompanying
problems of articulation,6" and L.H., a seventeen-year-old girl.62 Evi-
dence presented in the case, including the plaintiffs' complaint6" and
videotapes of classroom activities," reveals that these girls were sub-
jected frequently, two to four times per week for a five-month period in
the spring of 1990, to verbal abuse as well as physical and sexual assault
by fellow students within the classroom. The offensive conduct, as de-
scribed by D.R. in her complaint, extended not only to acts of offensive
touching but also to acts of sodomy, fellatio and masturbation. 6
These actions were perpetrated against the plaintiffs primarily in the
unisex bathroom and the darkroom contained within the graphic arts
classroom. A student teacher, also named as a defendant in the law-
suit, was present in the classroom during the alleged offensive behavior68
and was herself subjected to offensive touching by her students.69
The plaintiffs allege that school officials knew of the sexual assaults
in the graphic arts classroom. 0 In addition to the first-hand knowledge
of the student teacher, L.H. testified that she told the Assistant Director
of the school that she had been subjected to offensive sexual conduct.7 '
According to the plaintiffs, other officials named as defendants in the
lawsuit also knew of the situation.72  No one took action to stop the
shocking behavior or even to remove the plaintiffs from the classroom.73
61. Id. at 1366 n.5.
62. Id. at 1370.
63. Id. at 1378.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1366.
66. Id. at 1378. Chief Judge Sloviter, in her dissent, listed D.R.'s allegations as follows:
a) touching by the Perpetrator Defendants, and each of them, of the genital parts of
minor Plaintiff,
b) touching the breasts of minor Plaintiff,
c) forcing and causing minor Plaintiff to masturbate the Perpetrator Defendants, and
each of them;
d) causing and forcing minor Plaintiff to commit fellatio on the Perpetrator Defendants,
and each of them;
e) the commission of acts of sodomy on minor Plaintiff;
f) causing and forcing minor Plaintiff to watch and observe the Perpetrator Defendants,
and each of them, perform similar offensive sex acts on one or more other female stu-
dents in the graphics occupations classes;
g) causing and forcing minor Plaintiff to watch and observe the Perpetrator Defendants
have offensive physical contact-apparently non-sexual-with one or more of the
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B. Issue
Under these facts, can the plaintiffs maintain a § 1983 claim, assert-
ing that the defendant school district and school officials are liable for the
deprivation of plaintiffs' liberty interests, specifically, their right to main-
tenance of personal body integrity, when the perpetrators of the offensive
conduct were private individuals?
C. Holding
In spite of the shocking factual allegations in this case, the court
dismissed the constitutional claims against the school district and the
individual school officials on the grounds that the purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to protect individuals from actions of the state, not
to protect individuals from each other.74 When the perpetrators of the
injurious conduct are private individuals, a "special relationship" must
exist between the plaintiff and the state whereby the state has acted to
restrict the plaintiff's freedom to act on his own behalf before § 1983
liability will attach.75 As in DeShaney, the court held that the facts al-
leged by the Middle Bucks plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of
such a "special relationship."76
IV. ANALYSIS
The Middle Bucks decision focused on the validity of the plaintiffs'
constitutional claims which, if allowed, would impose liability on the de-
fendant school district and its employees when the acts causing the viola-
tion of plaintiffs' rights were perpetrated by private individuals, the
plaintiffs' classmates, while in the classroom. The court applied a strict
interpretation of the DeShaney decision to determine whether "special
relationship" custody existed between the plaintiffs and defendants.77
The court also attempted to clarify situations in which a theory of "state-
created danger" would necessitate a finding of liability. 8 Furthermore,
under these facts, a theory of liability which requires no special relation-
ship duty but rather a state established policy, custom or practice re-
ceived only a cursory analysis by the court.7 9 The court summarily
74. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, at 195.
75. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1364, at 1370.
76. Id. at 1373.
77. Id. at 1368-73.
78. Id. at 1373-76.
79. Id at 1376.
1993]
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dismissed plaintiffs' final theory of liability, that the defendants had con-
spired to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, because plaintiffs
failed to assert any facts to support the existence of a conspiratorial
agreement between the school defendants and the student defendants.80
A. "Special Relationship" Custody
Because private individuals' actions deprived the Middle Bucks
plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected rights, the court immediately
applied the DeShaney analysis for determining whether a "special rela-
tionship" existed between the plaintiffs and the school defendants.8 ' If
found to exist, this "special relationship" would serve to place the plain-
tiffs in the school defendants' custody for purposes of § 1983 liability.82
In other words, the state does not have a duty to protect against actions
of private actors unless a "special relationship" exists.83
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court attempted to define the parameters
of a "special relationship." Such a relationship clearly exists when the
state takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will.84 In these situations, the Constitution imposes upon the State a
duty to assume some responsibility for a person's safety and general well-
being.85 Incarceration 86 and involuntary institutionalization8 7 exemplify
special relationship custody. The DeShaney Court stressed that it is the
deprivation of liberty which triggers the protections of the Due Process
Clause, rather than the State's failure to protect against harm inflicted by
other means. s
The Middle Bucks holding implies that the only special relationship
that warrants the finding of an affirmative Constitutional duty to protect
occurs when the state has full-time custody of the victim.89 Thus the
Middle Bucks court interpreted DeShaney narrowly. Only when the
state has full-time custody are individuals powerless to provide for them-
selves, unable to seek outside help to meet their basic needs, and unable
80. Id. at 1376-77.
81. See supra, notes 51-59.
82. DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, 197-200.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 199-200.
85. Id. at 200.
86. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (reasoning that because the prisoner is unable to
care for himself due to his loss of liberty, it is only "just" that the State be required to care for him).
87. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that the State was required to
provide those services necessary to protect mental patients from themselves and others).
88. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
89. See Huefner, supra note 32, at 1949-50.
[Vol. 28:911
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to leave.90
In contrast, at most, public schools can be viewed as having "inter-
mittent" custody of school children. 91 The Middle Bucks majority char-
acterizes the public school environment as being controlled primarily by
the students' parents. 92 For example, parents decide whether their chil-
dren are to be educated at home, public or private schools.93 Further-
more, in public schools, parents may, subject to truancy penalties,
remove their child as they see fit.94 In the case of children qualifying for
special education,95 parents must approve their child's schedule giving
these parents even greater control of their child's educational environ-
ment.96 The majority concludes, therefore, that plaintiffs failed to estab-
lish the existence of special relationship custody as defined by DeShaney.
Even though plaintiff D.R. was required by law to attend school97 and
school defendants were authorized to exercise disciplinary control, 98 the
school defendants did not restrict D.R.'s freedom to the extent that she
was prevented from meeting her basic needs. 99 The court also noted
that, unlike prisoners or mental patients, school children have meaning-
ful access to help"° by virtue of their home life 1 and the lack of restric-
tions placed on student activities by the school after school hours.l12
Other courts, 103 legal scholars1" and the Middle Bucks dissent10 5
90. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1364, 1371.
91. See Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadel-
phia, 874 F.2d 156, 168 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that where mentally retarded individuals lived at
home and received vocational and support services, it was impossible to find an affirmative duty to
protect for such "intermittent" custody).
92. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1371. The in locoparentis status afforded to Pennsylvania teachers
and principals (13 Pa. Code § 1317) "invests authority in public school teachers; it does not impose a
duty upon them." Id. (citing Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass'n v. Department of Public Welfare, 449
A.2d 89, 92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982)). Furthermore, in spite of the in loco parentis status of schools,
parents retain the primary caretaker status. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Plaintiff D.R., by reason of her hearing impairment, qualified for special education. Id. at
1366 n.5.
96. Id. at 1371.
97. The Pennsylvania truancy laws reach only to the age of 16. When the offensive incidents
occurred, plaintiff D.R. was 16 years of age and plaintiff L.H. was 17 years of age. Therefore, the
compulsory attendance argument proposed by plaintiffs applies only to D.R. L.H. was no longer
required by law to attend school. Id. at 1370.
98. See supra note 93 (describing the in loco parentis status of school officials).




103. See, eg., Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989); Swader v.
Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).
104. See Huefner, supra note 32.
105. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1377 (Sloviter, c.j., dissenting).
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argue forcefully, however, that the majority's interpretation of DeShaney
was too narrow. Key language from DeShaney indicates the Supreme
Court did not intend to limit findings of a § 1983 affirmative duty en-
tirely to complete custody situations. 106 A duty to protect can arise from
"the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act
on his own behalf - through incarceration, institutionalization, or other
similar restraint ofpersonal liberty ... ." 107 Had the Court intended the
existence of an affirmative duty to be limited only to custody situations, it
could have said "or other similar types of custody." 10 8
Thus, if the focus of the analysis in Middle Bucks were changed
from an involuntary custody approach, to a noncustodial approach, 10 9
plaintiffs may have succeeded. It can be effectively argued that schools
can and do substantially restrict the personal liberties of students while at
school.110 Often, discipline may require the exercise of the school's in
loco parentis status.1 I1  Also, schools effectively control students' move-
ment.11 2 In addition, schooling can be viewed as involuntary in that sub-
stantial compulsion is associated with it.1 '
Application of a noncustodial analysis also provides a more realistic
view of the psychological component of the situation faced by the Middle
Bucks plaintiffs. The majority proposed that school children are able to
seek outside sources of help, unlike persons in custodial relationships
with the state as defined by DeShaney.1 14 However, it is generally ac-
knowledged that children are reluctant to disclose sexual abuse.' 15 In
addition, plaintiff D.R. may have been exceptionally vulnerable to the
106. Id at 1379.
107. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).
108. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1379.
109. See Huefner, supra note 32. A noncustodial approach is not precluded by the DeShaney
decision. Id.
110. See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1377 (dissenting opinion).
11. Id. at 1380.
112. Id. Several facts alleged by the Middle Bucks plaintiffs demonstrate this form of restriction.
For example, D.R. was repeatedly refused passes to use a restroom outside of the graphic arts class-
room. This action by the school, in effect, forced her to use the unisex restroom. Id. at 1380.
Furthermore, students cannot simply walk out of school, as implied by the majority, without violat-
ing the truancy laws. Id. at 1380-81.
113. Id. Chief Judge Sloviter's dissent views the majority's minimalization of compulsory educa-
tion laws as contrary to reality. Id. at 1380. For the vast majority of American households, a public
school education is the only financially feasible option available for satisfying the compulsory attend-
ance laws. Id. This is in contrast to the majority's assertion that parents may readily choose among
the options of private schooling, home schooling, and public schooling. Id. at 1371.
114. See text accompanying note 100, supra.
115. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1381 (citing Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1459-60 (8th Cir.),
cerL denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987); Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 709 F.2d 782, 785
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983)).
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indignities of the abusive situation due to her limited ability to communi-
cate effectively." 6 The majority's contention that because these young
girls could have easily sought outside help, their complaint fails to meet
the custodial requirements of DeShaney, incorrectly simplifies the situa-
tion and does not reflect the realities of sexual abuse. State protection
should have been found to extend to plaintiffs in this circumstance in
spite of the absence of special relationship custody defined by DeShaney.
B. State Created Danger
Language from the Supreme Court's DeShaney decision also serves
as the basis for the "state created danger" theory of liability asserted by
the Middle Bucks plaintiffs. 1 7 The Supreme Court noted that "[w]hile
the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the
free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to
render him more vulnerable to them." '18 The clear implication from this
language is that if the defendant state officials create the dangerous situa-
tion or do anything to increase the plaintiff's vulnerability, then liability
may result. The Middle Bucks plaintiffs asserted that the school officials'
acts or omissions "created a climate which facilitated sexual and physical
abuse of students." 1 9 According to the majority's interpretation of the
plaintiffs' claim, the school defendants caused or increased their risk of
harm by:
1) failing to report to the parents or other authorities the misconduct
resulting in abuse to plaintiffs;
2) placing the class under the control of an inadequately trained and
supervised student teacher;
3) failing to demand proper conduct of the student defendants; and
4) failing to investigate and put a stop to the physical and sexual
misconduct. 120
Again relying on the quoted DeShaney language and a line of post-
DeShaney decisions,121 the court indicated that liability under this theory
would be predicated only upon affirmative acts of the defendants.
1 22
Since the plaintiffs' allegations included, in the majority's opinion, only
116. Id. D.R. also feared that if she reported the abuse to anyone, she may lose what she viewed
as her last educational opportunity. Id.
117. Id. at 1373.
118. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
119. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1373.
120. Id.
121. See, eg., Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989); Wood v.
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990).
122. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1373-74.
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acts of omission, no liability could attach. In a glaring example of under-
statement, the majority stated that:
[t]he school defendants' "acts" in assigning student teacher Peters to
the graphic arts class and failing to supervise her more closely, as well
as their failure to put a stop to the non-sexualpandemonium may have
created a recognizable risk that plaintiffs would receive little education
in that class, and perhaps, physical injury due to the rough-
housing. 123Failure to recognize the foreseeability of the sexual abuse
suffered by the plaintiffs, given the observable activities known to be
occurring within the classroom, should have clearly constituted delib-
erate indifference by the school officials.
The plaintiffs' argument for liability under this "state created dan-
ger" theory is strengthened by the fact that the abuses took place during
school hours and in the classroom. This factor is unquestionably closely
linked to the custody issue.124 However, given the court's reliance on
DeShaney, it should be noted that the quoted DeShaney language re-
ferred to "dangers that Joshua faced in the free world,"' 25 that part of his
world over which the state presumably had no control. In contrast, the
dangers faced by the Middle Bucks plaintiffs were present in their class-
room during school hours, a place and time over which the defendant
school officials could have and should have easily exercised control.
Therefore, notwithstanding the majority's refusal to find special relation-
ship custody in this case, the determination that the defendants did not
affirmatively act to create the environment which deprived the plaintiffs
of their constitutionally protected rights should not serve to dispose of
the plaintiffs' argument. Rather, because the school tolerated unaccept-
able risks to the safety of students, it should be liable under § 1983 for its
failure to protect students from harm.
126
C. State Established Policy, Custom or Practice
The third theory of liability proposed by the Middle Bucks plaintiffs
is that the school defendants deliberately and recklessly established and
maintained a custom, practice or policy which caused the plaintiff's inju-
ries. 127 The court acknowledged that it had recognized the validity of
this theory in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District.'28 However, in
Stoneking, the perpetrator of the offensive conduct was an employee of
123. Id. at 1374 (emphasis added).
124. See text accompanying notes 81-116, supra.
125. See supra note 107.
126. Huefner, supra note 32, at 1968.
127. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1376.
128. 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990) (Stoneking II).
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the state. 12 9 Therefore, the court determined that Stoneking was inappli-
cable to the Middle Bucks facts which involved private actors.
Had the court applied a noncustodial analysis to determine that
schools affirmatively act to restrain students' personal liberty while they
are in attendance and therefore the school owes a duty to protect its
students from acts which deprive them of their constitutionally protected
right to maintenance of bodily integrity, the next step in the § 1983 anal-
ysis would be to determine whether the state's activities were "under
color of state law."130 If the school is executing a policy or custom, the
"under color of state law" requirement is met.131
In cases brought under § 1983 in which the perpetrators were state
actors as opposed to private individuals, deliberate indifference by the
state has been found to constitute a "policy or custom" and, thus, sup-
port a holding of entity liability.13 2 Given the seriousness of the abuse
inflicted upon the Middle Bucks plaintiffs, the length of time it was "tol-
erated," and the fact that at least two teachers and administrators knew
of the situation,1 33 the school's failure to act definitely rises above mere
negligence to the level of deliberate indifference. 134 Furthermore, entity
liability requires that the execution of a school policy or custom caused
the alleged deprivation of rights.13 ' The Middle Bucks plaintiffs could
easily assert that they would not have suffered a deprivation of their
fights but for the school's policy of deliberate indifference. Therefore,
although the Middle Bucks majority indicates that only affirmative acts
contributing to the state creation of danger will lead to liability, applica-
tion of legal precedent and analogy from other categories of § 1983 litiga-
tion support the argument that if a duty to protect is owed to the
individual, then deliberate indifference, including a complete failure to
act, qualifies as a school policy and could support a finding of liability
under § 1983.
It has been suggested that the validity of a § 1983 claim should turn
on the causal relationship between the inaction and the harm rather than
on the existence of a custodial relationship.13 6 If the governmental entity
has played a key role either in placing the victim in a dangerous situation
129. In Stoneking, a high school band teacher had sexually abused the plaintiff, one of his stu-
dents. The conduct was allowed to continue even after school officials became aware of it. Id.
130. See text accompanying notes 21-59, supra.
131. Id.
132. See text accompanying notes 58-60, supra.
133. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1366, 1378.
134. See supra note 30.
135. See text accompanying notes 40-42, supra.
136. See Huefner, supra note 32, at 1962-63.
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or in increasing the risk of harm to the victim by its inaction then its
failure to protect should serve as a basis for § 1983 liability. '37
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE BUCKS DECISION
The Middle Bucks decision may reflect the Third Circuit's concerns
for the potential increase in litigation and concomitant court crowding
that could result from a broadened interpretation of DeShaney.138 How-
ever, Chief Judge Sloviter argued that other decisions set limits and
provide guidance in this area. 139 For example, a finding of liability under
§ 1983 imposes a high standard of culpability,"4 limitations on the type
of conduct on which liability can be based,14 t and the broad application
of the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for individual
defendants.142
Chief Judge Sloviter's dissent also points out that if courts were to
extend the public school's duty to protect its students to include a situa-
tion such as that which occurred at the Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical School, the school could, if justified, exempt itself based on
facts peculiar to the case. For example, if the school produced evidence
demonstrating that the plaintiffs possessed the maturity required for
them to seek outside help under these circumstances, then the duty to
protect would not apply.14 3
Arguably the importance attached to school safety outweighs the
concerns for increasing the burden on the schools. 1" The maintenance
of a secure environment is essential to the achievement of the school's
primary purpose of education.145 This attitude is reflected in the in-
creased latitude afforded to schools as they are allowed to infringe on
students' rights while conducting weapons searches, restricting student
137. Id.
138. A recent study indicates, however, that, for a variety of reasons, this concern has not been
realized. See Stewart J. Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation:
The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
719 (1988).
139. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1384.
140. Id. (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986)).
141. Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1989)).
142. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-20 (1982)).
143. In support of this argument, the chiefjudge indicates that maturity evaluations are success-
fully used in cases where minors seek abortions without parental consent. These situations employ
the procedure of judicial bypass to override the required parental consent if the minor presents
evidence which demonstrates that she possesses the maturity necessary to understand the ramifica-
tions of her decision. Id. at 1384 n.8 (citing Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497
U.S. 502 (1990)).
144. See Huefner, supra note 32, at 1969-1971.
145. Id. at 1970.
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movement off-campus during school hours, and employing other meth-
ods designed to increase security. 46 Given the ready acknowledgment
by the state and the schools of the potential for danger which would exist
at today's public schools if efforts to maintain safety were not taken, it is
only logical to extend the state's duty to protect schoolchildren to the
public schools. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that a finding of a
duty on the part of a school district to protect school children would be
accompanied by markedly expanded liability of the school district.147
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals' application of a narrow inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court's DeShaney decision to a fact situation
involving repeated, long-term sexual assault of public school students by
fellow students during school hours in the classroom resulted in the dis-
missal of plaintiffs' claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This unfor-
tunate holding serves to effectively eliminate substantive due process
protection for school children in spite of the state's direct role, both in
creating the injurious environment by compulsory attendance laws and
in the maintenance of the injurious environment, by deliberate, reckless
indifference to its existence.
Helen Holt Blake
146. Id.
147. Middle Bucks, 1992 WL 191115, *21. See also, Huefner, supra note 90, at 1961-62.
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